The Rupee Defence Now Comes With a 20% Bill

Since 10 October, an Indian company that wants to hedge its dollar payments has been paying more for the privilege. The Reserve Bank of India’s new rule requires banks to hold cash equal to 20 per cent of the rupee notional value of eligible foreign exchange derivative contracts used to hedge current-account transactions. Cash that sits idle has a cost, and banks have passed it on.
Importers have seen their effective hedging cost rise from roughly 3.5 per cent to about 5.1 per cent, according to market estimates. For a mid-sized exporter of engineering goods, that is not a rounding error. It is the difference between a margin and no margin on a thin order book.
What the rule actually does
The measure, which the market calls FERR, was introduced as a macroprudential tool. In plain terms: if a bank sells a company a forward contract to buy dollars in three months, it must now set aside rupee cash against 20 per cent of that contract’s notional value. The bank cannot lend that cash, and it cannot earn a spread on it. So it charges the customer for the funding cost instead.
The RBI’s purpose was to curb speculative positioning against the rupee. Through September the currency had been sliding, and a large part of the pressure was coming from corporates and traders who were hedging or betting in ways that amplified the move. By making the derivative book expensive, the central bank raised the price of the trade it wanted to discourage.
It worked, in the narrow sense. The rupee has appreciated about 1 per cent since the measures. Bloomberg reported a short squeeze on speculative bets against the currency. But the rule has also changed the plumbing of the forward market, and that is where the second-order effects are showing up.
The premium collapse
Dollar-rupee forward premiums have fallen to around 1 to 1.5 per cent annualised, multi-year lows. The premium is what an exporter earns by selling dollars forward instead of in the spot market. When it collapses, the carry trade that normally brings exporters into the forward market stops paying.
Both sides of the market are now behaving defensively. Importers are hedging less because it costs more. Exporters are converting less through forwards because the premium no longer compensates them. The result is a thinner forward market, which is precisely the opposite of what a central bank facing currency pressure wants: liquidity in the instrument that lets residents manage risk without moving the spot rate.
A rule designed to punish speculation has ended up taxing the hedges that make speculation less necessary.
The Crescent World
Who pays
The burden falls hardest on firms that cannot pass costs through quickly. Gems and jewellery, electronics assembly, edible oil refining and pharma importers operate on thin margins and buy in dollars on short cycles. Larger corporates can absorb the cost, hedge through offshore entities, or negotiate with several banks. Smaller firms take the price or stay unhedged and carry the currency risk themselves.
Staying unhedged is not free either. It transfers volatility onto the balance sheet, and a company that loses on a currency swing in a quarter with no pricing power is a company that cuts orders the next quarter. The central bank’s rule has made the visible cost of hedging higher and the hidden cost of not hedging larger.
The banks’ counter-proposal
Lenders have asked the RBI to replace the cash requirement with a direct charge on importers’ forward purchases. That would achieve the same deterrent with less distortion, because it would price the specific activity the regulator wants to discourage rather than immobilise bank capital across the whole derivative book. The RBI has not accepted the proposal, and banks say they still lack clarity on how the rule applies at the edges: which contracts count, how netting works, and what happens when a hedge is cancelled.
The confusion itself has a cost. Treasury desks price uncertainty, and a rule that is not fully understood gets an extra margin attached to it.
The reserves backdrop
India’s foreign exchange reserves fell $5.01 billion to $721.02 billion in the week to 16 October, the period in which the new rules were bedding in. That is a large stock by any measure, and the drawdown is small relative to it. But the direction matters: intervention to support the rupee and a rule that raises the cost of hedging both consume the buffer in different ways.
The RBI’s own bulletin struck a more confident note, pointing out that merchandise exports grew in double digits for a sixth consecutive month and that gold imports contracted sharply. A narrower trade deficit is the fundamental support the currency needs. The rule is a bridge until that shows up in the balance of payments.
What to watch
Whether the RBI softens the rule at its December meeting, and whether it clarifies the treatment of cancelled and restructured hedges. Whether forward premiums recover towards 2 per cent, which would signal that exporters are back. And whether foreign portfolio flows, which turned strongly positive this month, keep coming: the return of foreign money does more for the rupee than any derivative rule.
The central bank has bought itself time and a stronger currency. The bill for that is being paid, quietly, by the importer who used to hedge at 3.5 per cent and now pays five.
Illustration generated with AI (Z-Image Turbo, rendered locally) for The Crescent World.



