India’s Battery Scrap Is Now Too Valuable to Leave

The most consequential trade decision of the week concerned a black powder that almost nobody outside the battery industry has seen. On November 10, the Directorate General of Foreign Trade amended the export schedule for one tariff line — ITC (HS) code 85491400 — from “Free” to “Prohibited.” The material is lithium-ion battery black mass: the shredded, sieved remains of spent cells and manufacturing scrap, rich in lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese and graphite. India has decided that this waste is too valuable to leave.
The notification is short, technical and immediate. It covers unsorted waste and scrap from primary cells and electric accumulators that do not contain lead, cadmium or mercury, and will remain in force until further orders. But the change signals a shift in industrial strategy: India is no longer content to be a mine for other countries’ factories, even when the mine is its own rubbish.
A country that exports its scrap is exporting its future battery. India has decided to keep it.
The Crescent World
What black mass actually is
When a lithium-ion battery reaches the end of its life, recyclers dismantle it, shred it and separate out the steel, copper, aluminium and plastic. What remains is a fine dark powder that contains the chemistry that made the battery work. Depending on the cell type, it can hold recoverable quantities of lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese and graphite. Hydrometallurgical refining can turn those residues back into battery-grade compounds. In an economy that imports all of its lithium and most of its nickel and cobalt, black mass is not waste. It is an urban ore body.
The scale is becoming serious. Industry estimates suggest that India’s 3.2 million tonnes of e-waste could generate about 30,000 tonnes of black mass a year. The country already has 57 lithium-ion battery recyclers registered on the Central Pollution Control Board’s Battery Waste Extended Producer Responsibility portal, with combined processing capacity of about 5.17 lakh tonnes a year. But capacity specifically configured to process black mass is estimated at only around 75,500 tonnes a year.
It has not stayed at home. Some Indian recyclers found it easier to sell black mass abroad than recover the minerals. Much of it ends up in China, which has the world’s largest recycling and cell-manufacturing base and therefore the deepest demand for recovered feedstock. India has been exporting the hard part of the circular economy and importing the finished product back.
The policy stack behind the ban
The export prohibition did not arrive alone. Days earlier, the Union Cabinet approved a Rs 2,814 crore scheme to support capital expenditure for critical mineral processing. In September, the government launched a Rs 1,500 crore incentive scheme for critical mineral recycling. Battery Waste Management Rules already require manufacturers to finance collection and recycling. The ban is the missing link: it creates captive feedstock for the capacity the other schemes are paying to build.
Resource nationalism, version 2.0
India is joining a broader shift. Indonesia banned nickel ore exports in 2020 and built a domestic stainless-steel and battery-materials industry on the back of it. Zimbabwe and Namibia banned raw lithium exports. China, which dominates graphite and battery processing, has imposed export controls on high-performance lithium-ion batteries, cathode materials and artificial-graphite anodes. The common logic is that the country which processes the mineral captures more value than the country which digs it.
The hard parts
Three risks stand out. The first is enforcement. The Global Trade Research Initiative has warned that exporters may try to disguise black mass as cobalt powder, a nickel intermediate or another industrial product. Customs officials will need to examine how a shipment was produced, not merely how it is declared; a change of description or tariff code could conceal the same waste. India’s border agencies are not equipped for that kind of scrutiny.
The second is technical capability. Recovering lithium, nickel and cobalt at battery grade is not the same as shredding batteries. It requires hydrometallurgical plants, skilled operators, quality control and years of process learning. A protected feedstock market can help recyclers climb that curve, but it can also shelter inefficient plants if the policy is not paired with performance standards. Incentives will need to reward recovery rates, not just capacity announcements.
The third is the informal sector. A large share of India’s e-waste is collected by informal workers who dismantle batteries in unsafe conditions. A ban does not redirect that material into registered facilities. Without collection infrastructure and fair prices for small collectors, the feedstock may leak into unregulated channels, creating environmental damage without industrial benefit.
Why the Global South should care
Most developing countries face the same trap: they consume batteries, generators, phones and electric vehicles, then export the residue for a fraction of its mineral value. The result is a double loss — they pay for imported critical minerals and then give away the secondary supply that could reduce their dependence on those imports. India’s ban is an attempt to break that loop, and its success will be watched across the developing world.
The policy also has a geopolitical edge. China’s dominance of battery processing gives it leverage over the entire electric-vehicle supply chain. India’s response — subsidise processing, retain feedstock, build domestic cell manufacturing — is expensive and slow, but it is the only route to anything resembling autonomy. The alternative is to keep importing finished cells made partly from India’s own discarded batteries.
None of this will show up in a quarterly GDP print. The ban is a bet on a future in which countries that recover lithium, nickel and cobalt from their own waste are less exposed to the next supply shock. It is also a test of whether India can move from announcing industrial policy to enforcing it. The powder is dark, unglamorous and easy to misdeclare. That is why the next year of customs data will tell us more than the press release did.
Illustration generated with AI (Z-Image Turbo, rendered locally) for The Crescent World.



