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Bangladesh Has Done Its Part. Hasina’s Return Is India’s Call.

Bangladesh’s law minister gave reporters in Dhaka on Saturday a sentence built to close a file rather than open one. “We have completed everything required from our side as part of the legal process,” Md Asaduzzaman said of the effort to bring Sheikh Hasina back. “What they will do is up to them.”

The “they” is India, where the former prime minister has lived since she left Dhaka in August 2024. The “everything” is two years of case files, warrants and diplomatic notes. What is left is not legal work. It is a decision, and it belongs to New Delhi.

What Dhaka has finished

In November 2025 the International Crimes Tribunal convicted Hasina of crimes against humanity over the crackdown that ended her government, and sentenced her to death in absentia. The law minister’s point on Saturday was that the process has run its course: the verdict is in, the warrant stands, and in his account there is no further appeal available to her.

Dhaka has also sent the paperwork that a request of this kind requires. India has acknowledged receiving it. It has not answered it. That silence is now the story, because a request that is neither granted nor refused keeps both governments in a position they can defend at home.

The minister’s phrasing matters more than it looks. By saying Bangladesh has done its part, he moves the question out of the courts and into the foreign ministry. Extradition is never a legal event in South Asia; it is a political one dressed in legal language.

The file is closed in Dhaka. In New Delhi it has not been opened.

The Crescent World

The treaty has doors

The two countries signed an extradition treaty in 2013 and revised it in 2016. It is not a pipeline. It lists the offences that qualify, the documents a request must carry, and the grounds on which the requested state may say no.

One of those grounds is the political offence exception, which appears in treaties of this family precisely because governments do not want to hand over people they regard as persecuted rather than prosecuted. Hasina’s party calls the tribunal’s proceedings political. Dhaka calls them a crimes-against-humanity trial. That argument will be had inside the Indian system long before it is had in a courtroom.

The second door is the sentence itself. India’s extradition practice weighs assurances about the death penalty, and Bangladesh has offered no public commitment that a returned Hasina would not face the gallows. A request that arrives attached to a death sentence is harder to grant than one that does not.

There is a third consideration that Dhaka does not say aloud. The tribunal’s legitimacy is contested not only by Hasina’s party but by international observers who questioned whether a court created under her government’s own rules could try the person who once controlled it. India can decline on that basis without ever appearing to protect a fugitive, which is precisely why the request is uncomfortable for Dhaka: a refusal that sounds principled is harder to answer than one that sounds partisan.

Why December keeps surfacing

Reports that Hasina intends to return in December have circulated for weeks. If she does, the legal question dissolves. A voluntary return is not an extradition, and no Indian court has to rule on anything.

That option suits everyone differently. It would let her argue that she chose the courtroom and that no government surrendered her. It would let Dhaka claim the outcome without having to extract it. And it would let Delhi avoid a precedent it has spent two years declining to set: that a former leader who was once its closest partner in the region can be handed to a tribunal.

What India is weighing

New Delhi’s calculation is not sentimental. Bangladesh shares a long border, hosts Indian transit ambitions, buys Indian goods and matters to India’s security map in the east. The interim government in Dhaka has kept the relationship running on protocol rather than warmth, and handing over Hasina would not improve that.

Nor would refusing. A flat no would confirm Dhaka’s suspicion that India shelters the person it says committed the worst political crime in the country’s history. The Indian position so far has been to do neither, which is a strategy only until someone forces a deadline.

The wider test is regional. India’s claim to lead the Global South rests on a promise that it plays by rules rather than by patronage. A request that sits unanswered for years is a small, specific contradiction of that promise, and Dhaka knows it.

What to watch

Three markers will settle this. Whether India moves from acknowledging the request to answering it in writing. Whether Hasina books a flight of her own, which would make the treaty irrelevant. And whether Dhaka escalates, through its courts, through regional bodies, or by making the case a condition of ordinary cooperation.

The minister’s sentence was accurate as far as it went. Bangladesh has finished its argument about the law. The argument that remains is about consequences, and it is being conducted in a capital that has not yet said what it thinks.

Illustration generated with AI (Z-Image Turbo, rendered locally) for The Crescent World.

Ganesh Kumar R

Ganesh Kumar R writes and edits The Crescent World, with a focus on India's economy, technology and its place in a multipolar world.

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